Spreading assets across many active managers feels like textbook prudence. You diversify single-manager risk, you respect capacity constraints, and no single bad year sinks the program. But there is a cost that rarely shows up in a manager-selection memo: as you add managers, their active bets increasingly cancel out, and the aggregate portfolio drifts toward the benchmark — while the fees stay resolutely active. This article unpacks the mechanics of overdiversification and a framework for spending an active-risk budget more productively.

Why the problem matters now

The backdrop sharpens the stakes. With forward equity returns widely expected to be lower than the recent past, excess return matters more, not less. When beta is doing less of the heavy lifting, paying active fees for index-like aggregate exposure is a more expensive mistake than it used to be.

The mechanics of cancellation

The intuition is simple. Each active manager holds positions that differ from the benchmark — that difference is the active risk (tracking error) and active share you are paying for. But different managers’ overweights and underweights are partly uncorrelated. One manager’s overweight in a name is another’s underweight. Combine enough of them and the offsets dominate: the aggregate book’s deviations from the benchmark shrink toward zero.

The evidence is stark. US defined-benefit plans hold a lot of managers — large plans (over $50bn) hold around 30 equity funds on average, and the all-pension average is around 17. A randomized study using the Morningstar equity mutual-fund universe (equal-weighted, on the order of 10,000 iterations) shows what that does: as the number of portfolios grows from 1 to 10, aggregate active risk falls by more than half (roughly from low-3% to low-1% tracking error) and active share drops sharply (from the low-70s to the high-30s).

The fees, meanwhile, do not fall. So the fee per unit of active risk — and per unit of active share — rises. You are paying progressively more for progressively less of the thing you hired active managers to deliver. That is the definition of overpaying.

A decomposition of where returns come from

To spend the active-risk budget well, it helps to decompose a manager’s return into three layers:

Most of what overdiversification cancels out is the factor and alpha layer — exactly the part you are paying up for. What survives the cancellation is mostly beta, which you could have bought for a few basis points.

A menu of vehicles

Different vehicles occupy different points on the cost / active-risk spectrum:

Vehicle Active risk Fee Scalability
Index None / very low Very low Very high
Smart beta Low–moderate (systematic) Low High
Enhanced active Low tracking error Moderate Moderate
Concentrated active High active risk High Low

The insight is that a few concentrated or enhanced-active portfolios can deliver the same aggregate alpha and active-risk profile as a sprawling roster of diluted managers — at a materially lower blended fee, because their bets are not being washed out against each other.

A framework for rebalancing the alpha budget

The solution is not “fire managers” but balance the sources of alpha against their fees:

The governing principle: optimize fee productivity — alpha and active risk per dollar of fee — at the level of the total portfolio, not manager by manager.

Takeaways

Diversifying across managers is sound risk management up to a point. Past that point, it becomes an expensive way to buy the index.


Educational commentary only. Figures cited reflect publicly described studies and are used illustratively. No proprietary models, client-specific material, or named holdings are reproduced. Nothing here is investment advice.